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Summary 
In 2008, Canadian pipeline company TransCanada filed an application with the U.S. Department 
of State to build the Keystone XL pipeline, which would transport crude oil from the oil sands 
region of Alberta, Canada, to refineries on the U.S. Gulf Coast. Keystone XL would have the 
capacity to transport 830,000 barrels per day, delivering crude oil to the market hub at Cushing, 
OK, and further to points in Texas. The project is expected to cost more than $7.0 billion, of 
which at least $5.4 billion would be spent on the U.S. portion. TransCanada plans to build a short 
additional pipeline so that oil from the Bakken formation in Montana and North Dakota can also 
be carried on Keystone XL. Many Members of Congress have expressed support or opposition to 
the pipeline due to its potential environmental, energy security, and economic impacts. 
As a facility connecting the United States with a foreign country, the pipeline requires a 
Presidential Permit from the State Department. In granting or denying a permit application, the 
State Department must determine whether a proposal is in the “national interest.” Such a 
determination must be arrived at in consultation with other relevant federal agencies and after 
public input. The determination includes an evaluation of factors including the proposed project’s 
potential to affect the environment, economy, energy security, or foreign policy. 
Potential environmental impacts of the proposed Keystone XL project were identified and 
considered in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared by the State Department 
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Publication of the final EIS on 
August 26, 2011, marked the beginning of a 90-day review period for the national interest 
determination. According to the State Department, a wide range of public comments both 
favoring and opposing the pipeline project were received during this period. In particular, the 
department cited concerns regarding the pipeline’s route through the Sand Hills region of 
Nebraska, an extensive sand dune formation with highly porous soil and shallow groundwater. 
On November 10, 2011, in response to concerns regarding the pipeline route and actions by the 
Nebraska legislature applicable to pipeline siting, the State Department announced a delay in its 
national interest determination to gather additional information necessary to assess a new pipeline 
route avoiding the Sand Hills. On November 14, 2011, TransCanada announced its decision to 
work with the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality to identify an acceptable pipeline 
route around the Sand Hills. The State Department estimates that the preparation of supplemental 
environmental analysis necessary for a new route alternative may be complete in early 2013. 
International pipeline projects like Keystone XL are not subject to the direct authority of 
Congress. Nonetheless, several legislative proposals seek to impose deadlines on the permit 
process or require a permit to be issued. The Jobs Through Growth Act (H.R. 3400) would require 
the President to issue a final order granting or denying the Presidential Permit for the Keystone 
XL pipeline within 30 days of enactment. The North American Energy Security Act (S. 1932), the 
American Energy Security Act (H.R. 3537), and the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation 
Act of 2011 (H.R. 3630) would require the Secretary of State to issue a permit for the project 
within 60 days of enactment, unless the President publicly determines the project to be not in the 
national interest. The North American Energy Access Act (H.R. 3548) would transfer the 
permitting authority over the Keystone XL pipeline project from the State Department to the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and would require the commission to issue a 
permit for the project within 30 days of enactment. 
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Introduction 
In September 2008, TransCanada (a Canadian company) applied to the U.S. Department of State 
for a permit to cross the U.S.-Canada international border with the Keystone XL pipeline project. 
If constructed, the pipeline would carry crude oil produced from the oil sands region of Alberta, 
Canada, to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries. Because the pipeline would connect the United States with 
a foreign country, it requires a Presidential Permit issued by the State Department. Issuance of a 
Presidential Permit requires a finding that the project would serve the “national interest.”  
In the course of gathering information necessary to make its national interest determination, the 
State Department identified various concerns raised by the public. On November 10, 2011, the 
State Department announced its decision to seek additional information about alternative pipeline 
routes before it could move forward with a national interest determination. More specifically, 
concerns regarding potential environmental impacts of constructing and operating the pipeline 
along the proposed route through the Sand Hills region of Nebraska led the State Department to 
decide that an assessment of potential alternative routes that would avoid that area was necessary. 
Subsequently, on November 14, 2011, TransCanada announced an agreement with the Nebraska 
Department of Environmental Quality to identify a pipeline route that would avoid the Sand Hills. 
The State Department estimates that the preparation of supplemental environmental analysis 
necessary for a new route alternative may be complete in early 2013. 
Members of Congress have expressed support for the proposed pipeline’s potential energy 
security and economic benefits while others have expressed reservations about its potential 
environmental impacts.1 Though Congress has no direct role in permitting the pipeline’s 
construction, it may have an oversight role stemming from federal environmental statutes that 
govern the pipeline’s application review process or may seek to influence the State Department 
process through other legislative means. For example, the North American-Made Energy Security 
Act (H.R. 1938), which was not enacted, would have directed the President to issue a final order 
granting or denying the Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline by November 1, 2011. 
The Jobs Through Growth Act (H.R. 3400), which was introduced on November 10, 2011, would 
require the President to issue a final order granting or denying the Presidential Permit for the 
Keystone XL pipeline within 30 days of enactment. The North American Energy Security Act (S. 
1932), which was introduced on November 30, 2011, would require the Secretary of State to issue 
a permit for the project within 60 days of enactment, unless the President publicly determines the 
project to be not in the national interest. The North American Energy Security Act (H.R. 3537), 
introduced on December 1, 2011, and the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 
(H.R. 3630), introduced on December 9, 2011, contain similar provisions for issuing a 
Presidential Permit within 60 days of enactment. The North American Energy Access Act (H.R. 
3548), introduced on December 2, 2011, would transfer the permitting authority over the 
Keystone XL pipeline project from the State Department to the Federal Energy Regulatory 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Juliet Eilperin, “Democratic Lawmakers Pressure Obama Administration on Both Sides of 
Keystone Pipeline Issue,” Washington Post, October 19, 2011; House Energy & Commerce Committee, Subcommittee 
on Energy and Power, Hearing on The American Energy Initiative, Discussion Draft of H.R. ____, the North American 
Made Energy Security Act of 2011, May 23, 2011; U.S. Senator Charles Grassley, Letter to Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, May 16, 2011; U.S. Senator Max Baucus, Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, 
September 10, 2010; U.S. Representative Henry A. Waxman, Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, July 
2, 2010. 
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Commission (FERC), and would require the commission to issue a permit for the project within 
30 days of enactment. 
This report describes the Keystone XL pipeline proposal and the process required for federal 
approval. It summarizes key arguments for and against the pipeline put forth by the pipeline’s 
developers, federal agencies, environmental groups, and other stakeholders. Finally, the report 
reviews the constitutional basis for the State Department’s authority to issue a Presidential Permit, 
and opponents’ possible challenges to this authority. 
Pipeline Description 
The U.S. portion of the Keystone XL pipeline project, as originally proposed, would pass through 
Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas (Figure 1). This route would consist of 
approximately 1,380 miles of 36-inch-diameter pipe and have the capacity to transport 830,000 
barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil to the United States, delivering up to roughly 200,000 bpd to an 
existing oil terminal in Oklahoma with the remainder sent further to delivery points in Texas.2 On 
November 14, 2011, TransCanada announced an agreement with the state of Nebraska to make as 
yet undetermined changes to the pipeline route in Nebraska to avoid environmentally sensitive 
areas.3 These route changes are expected to increase the pipeline mileage through the state, 
although the company expects to maintain the original route through the other states, including its 
planned delivery points, so the pipeline’s overall capacity should not be affected.  
                                                 
2 U.S. Department of State, Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL Oil Pipeline 
Project, April 15, 2011. p. 1-4. An initial capacity of 700,000 bpd may be raised to 830,000 bpd by increasing the 
pumping capacity. The Keystone XL project had applied to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration to operate at slightly higher pressure than permitted in standard regulations, which would have enabled 
a 900,000 bpd capacity, but it withdrew its applications for such a Special Permit in August, 2010. The company may 
reapply for this exemption in the future, however, even after the pipeline is constructed, should it be approved. 
3 TransCanada Corp., “Media Advisory - State of Nebraska to Play Major Role in Defining New Keystone XL Route 
Away From the Sandhills,” press release, November 14, 2011. 
Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 3 
Figure 1. TransCanada Keystone Pipeline and Original Keystone XL Proposed Route 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State, http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/clientsite/keystonexl.nsf/map.jpg?
OpenFileResource. 
Note: Figure 1 shows the developer’s originally proposed “preferred alternative” for the Keystone XL pipeline 
route according to Presidential Permit application documents, however, the route through Nebraska is expected 
to change. For discussion of alternative routes, see the State Department EIS discussed below. 
As of February 2011, the Keystone XL project along its original route was estimated to cost more 
than $7.0 billion, with the U.S. portion accounting for at least $5.4 billion of that total.4 That is 
higher than the cost estimate when the initial permit application was filed reportedly due to 
currency swings, changing regulatory requirements, and permitting delays.5 A new route would 
presumably be longer and cost more. The Keystone XL pipeline would be an extension of 
TransCanada’s existing Keystone pipeline, which links the Alberta oil sands to refineries in 
Illinois and Oklahoma (Figure 1). The Keystone pipeline received State Department approval on 
March 17, 2008, and began commercial operation in June 2010. 
                                                 
4 TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., Application of TransCanada Keystone Pipeline L.P. for a Presidential Permit 
Authorizing the Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of Pipeline Facilities for the Importation of Crude Oil to be 
Located at the United States-Canada Border, U.S. Dept. of State, September 19, 2008, p. 10, 
http://www.keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/clientsite/keystonexl.nsf/presidentialpermitapplication.pdf?
OpenFileResource. 
5 “TransCanada Expects $1-Billion Cost Escalation for Keystone XL Pipeline,” Canadian Press, February 17, 2011. 
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Keystone XL Extension to Bakken Oil Production 
The U.S. portion of the Bakken formation is an unconventional oil resource that underlies parts of 
North Dakota and Montana.6 By the end of 2010, U.S. Bakken production was 350,000 bpd.7 
Output has climbed further in 2011. The oil is transported to refineries by rail and truck, rather 
than by pipeline, which would be more economic. In part, this is because infrastructure has not 
kept up with rapid production growth in the Bakken region in recent years. Output is expected to 
increase significantly in the future, increasing the need for pipeline transportation capacity.8  
TransCanada has signed contracts with Bakken oil producers to carry 65,000 bpd from the region 
via the Keystone XL pipeline. While not the full 100,000 bpd of capacity TransCanada had 
offered to oil producers, this was enough to justify adding the Bakken Marketlink Project, a 
pipeline running from Baker, MT, to the Keystone XL pipeline, which can then carry crude to the 
oil hub at Cushing, OK, and on to the Gulf Coast.9 The Bakken Marketlink would have a 100,000 
bpd capacity and is estimated to cost $140 million. It could start operating in 2013 if it and the 
Keystone XL pipeline receive regulatory approvals.10  
These new Bakken contracts also improve the economics for Keystone XL, raising the amount of 
oil slated to flow through the pipeline.11 Lower transportation costs and access to new markets 
may support investment in the Bakken. Furthermore, TransCanada is not the only company 
adding pipeline capacity in the region. Notably, Enbridge, another Canadian pipeline company, 
has proposed the Bakken Pipeline Project, which will add 120,000 bpd of transport capacity to 
move Bakken oil to Midwest markets.12 According to Enbridge, sufficient pipeline capacity has 
been slow to emerge in the region because “they’re smaller players in the Bakken. They are not 
able to make the 20-year commitments and it’s been a lot of work to get them to commit to the 
level that [is] required to underwrite a major project out of the Bakken.”13 Rail transport capacity 
is also expanding.14 
                                                 
6 Richard M. Pollastro et al., Assessment of Undiscovered Oil Resources in the Devonian-Mississippian Bakken 
Formation, Williston Basin Province, Montana and North Dakota, 2008, U.S. Geologic Survey, National Assessment of 
Oil and Gas Fact Sheet (2008–3021), April 2008, p. 1, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3021/pdf/FS08-3021_508.pdf. The 
Bakken formation also stretches into parts of Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Canada.  
7 Nathan Vanderklippe, “TransCanada to Move U.S. Crude Through Keystone,” The Globe and Mail, January 26, 
2011. 
8 For more on Bakken oil production, see CRS Report R42032, The Bakken Formation: An Emerging Unconventional 
Oil Resource, by Michael Ratner et al. 
9 Jeffrey Jones, “TransCanada plans U.S. Bakken pipeline link,” Reuters, January 20, 2011. 
10 TransCanada, “TransCanada to Transport U.S. Crude Oil to Market Bakken Open Season a Success,” press release, 
January 11, 2011, http://www.transcanada.com/5631.html. 
11 Vanderklippe, 2011. 
12 Enbridge, “Bakken Pipeline Project—Project Overview,” press release, http://www.enbridge.com/
BakkenPipelineProjects/BakkenPipelineProjectUS.aspx. 
13 Lauren Krugel, “TransCanada attracts support for Montana-to-Oklahoma crude pipeline,” The Canadian Press, 
January 20, 2011. 
14 Selam Gebrekidan, “Bakken Rail Terminal Ships First Crude Cargo-Lario,” Reuters, November 9, 2011. 
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Presidential Permit Application Requirements and Status 
Ordinarily, the U.S. government does not have permit authority for oil pipelines, even interstate 
pipelines. This is in contrast to interstate natural gas pipelines, which, under Section 7(c) of the 
Natural Gas Act, must obtain a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” from the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission.15 Generally, the primary siting authority for oil pipelines would 
be established under applicable state law (which may vary considerably from state to state). 
However, the construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of a pipeline that connects the 
United States with a foreign country requires executive permission conveyed through a 
Presidential Permit. Since the Keystone and proposed Keystone XL pipelines are designed for the 
importation of oil from Canada, their facilities require a Presidential Permit. 
Executive Order 13337 delegates to the Secretary of State the President’s authority to receive 
applications for Presidential Permits.16 Issuance of a Presidential Permit is dependant upon a 
finding that the project would serve the national interest.17 In the course of making that 
determination, the State Department is obligated to consider a host of issues related to the 
proposed project including its potential impacts to the environment, economy, energy security, 
and foreign policy, to name a few. In that capacity, the State Department is required to consult 
with relevant federal and state agencies and to invite public comment in arriving at its 
determination. Ultimately, however, the State Department has discretion in determining what 
factors to examine to inform its determination of whether a proposed project is in the national 
interest (i.e., will be granted a Presidential Permit).  
Identifying and considering the potential environmental impacts of a proposed project is done 
within the context of the State Department’s preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS), as required pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et 
seq.).18 After issuing a Final EIS, a public review period begins during which the State 
Department receives comments from the public and local, state, tribal, and federal agencies. On 
November 11, 2011, in response to public review of the Keystone XL pipeline, the State 
Department announced its decision that environmental issues identified in the EIS and further 
stressed in public comments led it to seek additional information about an alternative pipeline 
route before making its final national interest determination.19 Requirements applicable to the 
State Department’s obligation to identify the potential environmental impacts of the proposed 
                                                 
15 15 USC §717f(c). 
16 See Executive Order 13337, “Issuance of Permits With Respect to Certain Energy-Related Facilities and Land 
Transportation Crossings on the International Boundaries of the United States,” 69 Federal Register 25299, May 5, 
2004, as amended, and Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 118-2 of January 26, 2006. The source of 
Permitting Authority for relevant Executive Orders is discussed further in the Appendix. 
17 Executive Order 13337, at Sec. 1(g). 
18 In processing Presidential Permit applications, the State Department is also explicitly directed to review the project’s 
compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. §470f), the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 
§1531 et seq.), and Executive Order 12898 of February 11, 1994 (59 Federal Register 7629), concerning environmental 
justice. In processing the permit application for the Keystone XL Pipeline project, issues associated with NEPA 
compliance have drawn the most attention. In large part, that is likely because it is during the NEPA process that 
compliance with these, as well as any other environmental requirements, would be identified, documented, and 
demonstrated.  
19 U.S. Department of State press release, “Keystone XL Pipeline Project Review Process: Decision to Seek Additional 
Information,” November 10, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/176964.htm.  
Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 6 
Keystone XL pipeline, as well as the effect that those impacts may have on its national interest 
determination, are discussed below. 
Identifying Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Pipeline 
Broadly, NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their actions 
before proceeding with them and to inform the public of those potential impacts. To ensure that 
environmental impacts are considered, an EIS must be prepared for major federal actions 
“significantly” affecting the environment.20 With respect to the application submitted by 
TransCanada, the State Department concluded that issuance of a Presidential Permit for the 
proposed construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of the Keystone XL Pipeline and 
its associated facilities at the United States border would constitute a major federal action that 
may have a significant impact upon the environment within the meaning of NEPA.21 For this 
reason, the State Department prepared an EIS to address reasonably foreseeable impacts from the 
proposed action and alternatives.  
Among other requirements, an EIS must include a statement of the purpose and need for an 
action, a description of all reasonable alternatives to meet that purpose and need, a description of 
the environment to be affected by those alternatives, and an analysis of the direct and indirect 
effects of the alternatives, including cumulative impacts.22 Accordingly, the State Department EIS 
must review and consider the potential environmental impacts of the entire pipeline (including the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of the pipeline and its associated facilities), not just the 
facilities at the border crossing.  
NEPA regulations require preparation of a Draft EIS that must be circulated for public and agency 
comment, followed by a Final EIS that incorporates those comments.23 Preparing the EIS is the 
responsibility of a designated “lead agency,” in this case, the State Department. In developing the 
EIS, the State Department must rely to some extent on information provided by TransCanada. For 
example, TransCanada’s permit application included an Environmental Report which was 
intended to provide the State Department with sufficient information to understand the scope of 
potential environmental impacts of the project.24  
The EIS must also identify any state, tribal, or federal licenses, permits or approvals applicable to 
the project in the United States.25 Further, in preparing the Draft EIS, the lead agency must 
                                                 
20 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C). 
21 U.S. Department of State, “Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and to Conduct Scoping 
Meetings and Notice of Floodplain and Wetland Involvement and to Initiate Consultation under Section 106 of the 
National Historic Preservation Act for the Proposed TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline,” 74 Federal Register 5020, 
January 28, 2009. 
22 In preparing an EIS associated with a Presidential Permit, NEPA regulations promulgated by both the Council of 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the State Department would apply. CEQ regulations implementing NEPA (under 40 
C.F.R. §§1500-1508) apply to all federal agencies. NEPA regulations applicable to State Department actions, which 
supplement the CEQ regulations, are found at 22 C.F.R. §161. 
23 For more analysis of NEPA requirements, see CRS Report RL33152, The National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA): Background and Implementation, by Linda Luther. 
24 Documents submitted by TransCanada are available online at http://www.keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/clientsite/
keystonexl.nsf?Open, under the heading “Project Documents.” 
25 Any consultation or approval necessary to comply with any additional requirements should occur concurrently and 
be integrated with preparation of the EIS. 
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request input from “cooperating agencies” which include any agency with jurisdiction by law or 
with special expertise regarding any environmental impact associated with the project.26 
Cooperating agencies for the Keystone XL project are the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA); the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS); the Department of the Interior’s 
Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service; the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers; the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency, Natural 
Resources Conservation Service, and Rural Utilities Service; the Department of Energy’s Western 
Area Power Administration; and state environmental agencies.  
In addition to its role as a cooperating agency, EPA is also required to review and comment 
publicly on the EIS and rate both the adequacy of the EIS itself and the level of environmental 
impact of the proposed project.27 Rating the EIS takes place after the draft is issued. The EIS 
could be rated either “Adequate,” “Insufficient Information,” or “Inadequate.” EPA’s rating of a 
project’s environmental impacts may range from “Lack of Objections” to “Environmentally 
Unsatisfactory” (EPA rating of environmental impacts is discussed in more detail, below). 
The State Department released its Draft EIS for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline project for 
public comment on April 16, 2010.28 The Draft EIS identified TransCanada’s “preferred 
alternative” (Figure 1) for the project as well as other alternatives considered. On July 16, 2010, 
EPA rated the Draft EIS “Inadequate.”29 EPA found that potentially significant impacts were not 
evaluated and that the additional information and analysis needed was of such importance that the 
Draft EIS would need to be formally revised and again made available for public review. 
Additional criticism of the State Department’s implementation of the NEPA process followed an 
October 21, 2010, statement by Secretary Clinton that, while analysis of the project was not 
complete and a final decision had not been made, the State Department was “inclined to” approve 
the project.30 Critics of the project, including some Members of Congress, stated that the 
Secretary’s statement appeared to prejudge its permit approval for the pipeline proposal as a 
foregone conclusion.31  
The State Department issued a Supplemental Draft EIS on April 15, 2011. In addition to 
addressing issues associated with EPA’s inadequacy rating, the Supplemental Draft EIS addressed 
                                                 
26 40 C.F.R. §1508.5. Also, Executive Order 13337 directs the Secretary of State to refer an application for a 
Presidential Permit to other specifically identified federal departments and agencies on whether granting the application 
would be in the national interest. 
27 For more information, see the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s “Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
Rating System Criteria” at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/comments/ratings.html. 
28 Documents prepared by the U.S. Department of State related to its NEPA requirements are available online at 
http://www.keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/clientsite/keystonexl.nsf?Open, under the heading “State Dept. Documents.” 
29 Letter from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to the U.S. Department of State regarding the Draft EIS for 
the Keystone XL project, July 16, 2010, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oeca/webeis.nsf/%28PDFView%29/20100126/$file/
20100126.PDF. 
30 See Secretary of State Hillary Clinton “Remarks on Innovation and American Leadership to the Commonwealth 
Club,” San Francisco, CA, October 15, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149542.htm. The 
statement by Secretary Clinton was actually made in response to a question about the Alberta Clipper pipeline project 
which received a Presidential Permit from the State Department in 2009, a State Department spokesman later clarified 
that the Secretary was referring to the Keystone XL pipeline permit approval. 
31 For example, see the October 21, 2010 letter from Senator Mike Johanns to Secretary Clinton expressing his concern 
that her statement gave the appearance that approval of the pipeline was a foregone conclusion 
http://johanns.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=8b090aa5-76fe-41ca-a674-ae9e37db8d36. 
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comments received from other agencies and the public. On June 6, 2011, EPA sent a letter to the 
State Department that rated the Supplemental Draft EIS as having “Environmental Objections—
Insufficient Information.”32 EPA acknowledged that the State Department had “worked 
diligently” to develop additional information in response to EPA’s comments and the large 
number of other comments on the Draft EIS. However, EPA believed that additional analysis 
needed to be included in the Final EIS to fully respond to its earlier comments. Among other 
items, EPA recommended that the State Department should do the following: improve the 
analysis of the potential oil spill risks, including additional analysis of other reasonable 
alternatives to the proposed pipeline route; provide additional analysis of potential oil spill 
impacts, health impacts, and environmental justice concerns to communities along the pipeline 
route and adjacent refineries; and improve its characterization of lifecycle greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with Canadian oil sands crude. 
In its June 6th letter to the State Department, EPA refers to agreements with the State Department 
that certain deficiencies identified in the Supplemental Draft EIS will be addressed in the Final 
EIS. Further, in its conclusion, EPA stated that it would carefully review the Final EIS to 
determine if it fully reflects those agreements and if measures to mitigate adverse environmental 
impacts are fully evaluated. 
On August 26, 2011, the State Department issued the Final EIS for the proposed Keystone XL 
Pipeline. EPA would generally rate the environmental impacts of the project based on the findings 
in the Final EIS. The project may receive a rating of either “Lack of Objections,” “Environmental 
Concerns,” “Environmental Objections,” or “Environmentally Unsatisfactory.” The State 
Department would be required to respond to EPA’s rating, as appropriate. However, in light of 
TransCanada’s decision to change the pipeline’s proposed route through Nebraska, and the State 
Department’s need to supplement the final EIS as a result, it is unclear whether EPA will provide 
formal comments to the August 26th EIS. 
Environmental Impacts and the Determination of National Interest  
Publication of the Keystone XL project’s Final EIS was followed by a 90-day review period. 
During such review periods, the State Department takes into account issues it deems necessary to 
make a national interest determination (e.g., factors related to the environment, economy, energy 
policy, and foreign policy, among other considerations). As part of this process for the Keystone 
XL project, the State Department held public meetings in each of the six states through which the 
proposed pipeline would pass and in Washington, DC.33 The meetings were intended to give 
members of the public additional opportunity to voice their opinions on issues they thought 
should be taken into account in determining whether granting or denying the Presidential Permit 
would be in the national interest.34 During the review period, the State Department received input 
from state, local, and tribal officials as well as members of the public. 
                                                 
32 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Letter to the U.S. Department of State on the Supplemental Draft EIS for the 
Keystone XL project, June 6, 2011 available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/keystone-xl-project-epa-
comment-letter-20110125.pdf.  
33 U.S. Department of State press release, “Keystone XL Final Environmental Impact Statement Released; Public 
Meetings Set,” August 26, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/171082.htm. 
34 These additional public meetings are not part of the NEPA process. Considering the strong public interest in the 
pipeline proposal (both opposed and in favor), the public hearings were part of the State Department’s national interest 
determination. 
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On November 10, 2011, the State Department issued a statement regarding the public comments 
and its response to those comments. According to the State Department, it received comments on 
a wide range of issues including the Keystone XL project’s potential impact on jobs, pipeline 
safety, health concerns, the societal impact of the project, and oil extraction in Canada. Concern 
regarding the proposed pipeline route through the Sand Hills area of Nebraska was identified as 
one of the most common issues raised. Comments regarding that pipeline route were consistent 
with the environmental impacts identified in the Final EIS with regard to the unique combination 
of characteristics of the Sand Hills region (e.g., a high concentration of wetlands of special 
concern, a sensitive ecosystem, and extensive areas of very shallow groundwater, discussed in 
more detail in the “Impacts to the Nebraska Sand Hills” section, below). Further, the Nebraska 
legislature was convening a special session to consider the legislation that would establish 
regulations applicable to pipeline siting within the state. Facing the prospect of new state pipeline 
siting regulations applicable to the Sand Hills, generally, together with the concern about the 
Keystone XL pipeline’s specific “preferred” route, the State Department determined it is 
necessary to examine alternative routes that would avoid this region in Nebraska, further 
discussed below. 
Ultimately, a final project decision will be reflected in a “Record of Decision and National 
Interest Determination,” signed by the State Department. A Record of Decision (ROD) is issued 
pursuant to NEPA. It formalizes the selection of a project alternative. For Presidential Permit 
applications, a ROD and national interest determination are usually issued as the same 
document.35 The State Department’s decision to gather additional information regarding the 
alternative pipeline routes illustrates the distinctly different, yet interrelated requirements 
applicable to the publication of a ROD and the national interest determination.  
Under NEPA, the State Department must fully assess the environmental consequences of an 
action and potential project alternatives before making a final decision. NEPA does not prohibit a 
federal action that has adverse environment impacts; it requires only that a federal agency be fully 
aware of and consider those adverse impacts before selecting a final project alternative. That is, 
NEPA is intended to be part of the decision-making process, not dictate a particular outcome. The 
State Department’s decision to issue a Presidential Permit, however, dictates a particular 
outcome—that a Permit will not be granted unless it is determined that the project is in the 
national interest. While NEPA does not prohibit federal actions with adverse environmental 
impacts, a project’s adverse environmental impacts (as well as other factors) may lead the State 
Department to determine that it is not in the national interest. 
Delay in Keystone XL Pipeline Permit Review 
Shortly after issuing its Final EIS, the State Department indicated that it expected to reach a final 
decision on whether to grant the Keystone XL permit before the end of 2011. The North 
American-Made Energy Security Act (H.R. 1938), which passed the House on July 7, 2011, 
would have directed the President to expedite the State Department’s permit review process, 
requiring a final decision to grant or deny the permit no later than November 1, 2011 (§3(c)). 
H.R. 1938 was motivated by the perception among some in Congress that the State Department 
was taking too long to review an energy infrastructure project critical to national security and 
                                                 
35 For example, see U.S. Department of State, Record of Decision and National Interest Determination, TransCanada 
Keystone Pipeline, LP Application for Presidential Permit, February 25, 2008, http://www.cardnoentrix.com/keystone/
project/SignedROD.pdf. 
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economic growth.36 Opponents of the bill argued that the project’s unique and potentially 
unacceptable safety and environmental risks, as well as its uncertain impacts on fuel prices, 
required more time for analysis and evaluation.37 The bill was not voted upon in the Senate, 
however, prior to the proposed November 1 deadline. 
The Jobs Through Growth Act (H.R. 3400), which was introduced on November 10, 2011, would 
require the President to issue a final order granting or denying the Presidential Permit for the 
Keystone XL pipeline within 30 days of enactment (§396(b)). Three subsequent bills, S. 1932, 
H.R. 3537, and H.R. 3630, would all mandate that the Secretary of State issue a Keystone XL 
permit within 60 days of enactment, unless the President publicly determines the project to be not 
in the national interest. The three bills would deem the current FEIS adequate (concluding the 
federal environmental review process) but require the permit to recognize an alternative pipeline 
route approved in the future by Nebraska, while not delaying construction elsewhere. The North 
American Energy Access Act (H.R. 3548), rather than imposing a deadline on the State 
Department, would transfer the permitting authority over the Keystone XL pipeline project from 
the State Department to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), requiring the 
commission to issue a permit for the project within 30 days of enactment. Changing the State 
Department’s role in issuing cross-border infrastructure permits may raise questions about the 
President’s executive authority, however, as further discussed in the Appendix.  
In October 2011, fourteen Members of Congress wrote to the State Department’s Office of 
Inspector General requesting an investigation of the department’s handling of the EIS and 
National Interest Determination for the Keystone XL project.38 The request was prompted, in part, 
by press reports suggesting bias or potential conflicts of interest in the State Department’s hiring 
of an outside contractor to perform the EIS and in its communications with the pipeline’s 
developer, TransCanada.39 On November 4, the Inspector General’s Office announced that, in 
response to this request, it was initiating a special review “to determine to what extent the 
Department and all other parties involved complied with Federal laws and regulations relating to 
the Keystone XL pipeline permit process.”40 The announcement did not indicate, however, how 
long this review would take and what impact it might have on the Presidential Permit application 
review schedule. 
On November 10, 2011, the State Department announced that it would require additional 
information about alternative pipeline routes avoiding the environmentally sensitive Sand Hills 
area in Nebraska before moving forward with its National Interest Determination.41 Although the 
                                                 
36 U.S. House of Representatives, Energy and Commerce Committee, “Committee Approves Legislation to Increase 
North American Energy Production and Create Jobs,” press release, June 23, 2011. 
37 See, for example, Representative Henry A. Waxman, “Opening Statement before the Full Committee Markup on 
Semi-Annual Committee Activity Report and H.R. 1938, the North American-Made Energy Security Act,” June 23, 
2011. 
38 U.S. Senator Bernard Sanders, et al., Letter to The Honorable Harold W. Geisel, Office of Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of State, October 26, 2011. 
39 See. for example, Elisabeth Rosenthal and Dan Frosch, “Pipeline Review is Faced With Question of Conflict,” New 
York Times, October 7, 2011. 
40 Harold W. Geisel, United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Information Memo for Deputy 
Secretary Burns,” November 4, 2011. http://sanders.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Special%20Review%20Keystone%20XL%20Pipeline%20Nov%2020112.pdf. 
41 U.S. Department of State, “Keystone XL Pipeline Project Review Process: Decision to Seek Additional 
Information,” Media Note, PRN 2011/1909, Office of the Spokesperson, November 10, 2011. 
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State Department did not decide that environmental issues led to a determination that the 
proposed project was not in the national interest, environmental issues identified in the Final EIS, 
and further stressed in public comments, led to its decision to delay that determination until it 
gathered this information. In a concurrent press release, President Obama stated 
Because this permit decision could affect the health and safety of the American people as 
well as the environment, and because a number of concerns have been raised through a 
public process, we should take the time to ensure that all questions are properly addressed 
and all the potential impacts are properly understood.42 
Although no new decision deadline has been established, State Department officials suggested 
that it would be “reasonable to expect that this process including a public comment period on a 
supplement to the final EIS consistent with NEPA could be completed as early as the first quarter 
of 2013.”43 In a recent press interview, President Obama also appeared to suggest that, 
notwithstanding the delegation of Presidential Permit authority to the State Department, he would 
be personally involved in the final decision on the Keystone XL Pipeline permit application.44 
Whatever the outcome of the State Department’s permit review, legal challenges appear likely. 
However, in the event of a challenge based on an environmental issue, the distinction between 
State Department actions required under NEPA and those required under its authority to issue a 
Presidential Permit would be relevant. NEPA does not create a private right of action. Instead, 
judicial challenges to a federal agency action under NEPA are brought pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5 U.S.C. §§706 et seq.). Presidential actions, however, are 
not subject to judicial review under the APA.45 So the final EIS associated with the Keystone XL 
Pipeline may be subject to judicial review, but the State Department’s national interest 
determination, made under its authority to issue a Presidential Permit, is not. For more 
information regarding the State Department’s authority to grant a Presidential Permit, see the 
Appendix. 
State Siting and Environmental Approvals 
As noted above, the federal government does not exercise siting authority over oil pipelines. 
Siting for the Keystone XL pipeline still must comply with any applicable state laws. These laws 
vary from state to state. South Dakota, for example, required TransCanada to apply for a permit 
for the Keystone XL pipeline from the state public utility commission, which issued the permit on 
April 25, 2010.46 Montana requires a certificate from the state’s Department of Environmental 
                                                 
42 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on the State Department’s Keystone XL 
Pipeline Announcement,” November 10, 2011. 
43 U.S. Department of State, November 10, 2011. 
44 KETV NewsWatch 7, “Uncut: KETV’s Rob McCartney Interviews President Obama,” Omaha, NE, November 1, 
2011, http://www.ketv.com/video/29652519/detail.html. 
45 While the APA’s definition of “agency” does not specifically exclude or include the president, the Supreme Court 
has held that exercises of presidential authority are not subject to judicial review because the president is not an agency 
(Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994)). The Court has also held that the APA does not apply to the president 
based on separation of powers principles (Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992)). 
46 South Dakota Public Utilities Commission, Final Decision and Order; Notice of Entry Before the Public Utilities 
Commission of the State of South Dakota, In the Matter of the Application by Transcanada Keystone Pipeline, LP for a 
Permit Under the South Dakota Energy Conversion and Transmission Facilities Act to Construct the Keystone Pipeline 
Project, HP07-001, http://puc.sd.gov/commission/orders/HydrocarbonPipeline/2008/hp07-001.pdf. 
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Quality,47 but has not yet granted one for the Keystone XL project. At the time of TransCanada’s 
application for a Presidential Permit, Nebraska did not have any permitting requirements that 
applied specifically to the construction and operation of oil pipelines, although a state statute does 
include an “eminent domain” provision, which grants eminent domain authority to oil pipeline 
companies that are unable to obtain the necessary property rights from the relevant property 
owners.48 Due to the controversy surrounding the Keystone XL project, Nebraska called a special 
session of its legislature to enact legislation to assert state authority over pipeline siting.49 A 
number of additional approvals and permits required by the states along the proposed route are 
summarized in TransCanada’s Presidential Permit application.50 All of the aforementioned state 
approvals are in various stages of review along the proposed Keystone XL pipeline route. 
Arguments For and Against the Pipeline 
Proponents of the Keystone XL pipeline, including Canadian agencies and U.S. and Canadian 
petroleum industry stakeholders, base their arguments supporting the pipeline primarily on 
increasing the diversity of the U.S. petroleum supply and economic benefits to the United States, 
including job creation. Environmental groups object to the project on the grounds that Canadian 
oil sands development has negative environmental impacts—particularly that development of oil 
sands releases more greenhouse gases than development of alternatives, like conventional oil or 
renewable fuels (discussed in greater detail below). Also, they argue that it promotes continued 
U.S. dependency on fossil fuels and affected communities along the route. Some members of the 
public are opposed to the selection of the proposed pipeline route. Opposition generally stems 
from concerns regarding potential impacts associated with the pipeline’s construction and 
operation in communities along the proposed route—particularly potential impacts to land use 
(e.g., cattle grazing) and groundwater contamination in the event of a release. As mentioned 
above, concern that ultimately delayed the State Department’s decision to make a national interest 
determination stemmed from concern regarding a segment of the route that crossed the Sand Hills 
region of Nebraska.  
Impacts to the Nebraska Sand Hills 
In the process of examining factors necessary to determine whether the Presidential Permit for the 
Keystone XL pipeline is in the national interest, the State Department decided that it needs to 
assess potential alternative pipeline routes that would avoid the Sand Hills region of Nebraska. 
Unique characteristics of the Sand Hills, including its high concentration of wetlands, extensive 
areas of very shallow groundwater, and its sensitive ecosystem, were identified as factors that 
resulted in increasing public concern over the proposed pipeline location. Subsequently, 
TransCanada announced that it would work with the Nebraska Department of Environmental 
Quality to identify a potential pipeline route that would avoid the Nebraska Sand Hills.51 
                                                 
47 Montana Major Facility Siting Act, Title 75, Chapter 20. 
48 Nebraska Rev. Stat. §57-1101. 
49 Kevin O’Hanlon, “Governor Signs Two Bills Into Law,” Lincoln Journal Star, November 23, 2011.  
50 TransCanada Keystone, L.P., Keystone XL Project: Preliminary Environmental Report, September 2008, Table 7, 
http://www.keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/clientsite/keystonexl.nsf/preliminaryenvironmentalreport.pdf?
OpenFileResource. 
51 TransCanada Corp., November 14, 2011. 
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To understand the concerns associated with potential environmental impacts of the construction 
and operation of a pipeline that crosses the Sand Hills (also referred to as the Sandhills) an 
understanding of the unique size and structure of the region is useful. The Sand Hills region is a 
19,600 square mile sand dune formation stabilized by native grasslands that cover 95% of its 
surface. The surface is highly susceptible to wind erosion if the grassland is disturbed.52 Below its 
surface lie hundreds of feet of course sand and gravel. Essentially, the porous soil acts like a giant 
sponge that quickly absorbs precipitation, allowing very little to run off. In some areas, the water 
table reaches the land surface—a characteristic that creates lakes that dot the region as well as 1.3 
million acres of wetlands.  
Figure 2. Keystone XL Pipeline Route Across the Ogallala Aquifer 
 
Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, Say No to Tar Sands Pipeline, 
November, 2010, p. 3. 
The loose, porous soil and sensitivity to wind erosion have been factors contributing to a lack of 
development on the Sand Hills. As a result, the region contains the most intact natural habitat of 
the Great Plains of the United States. The porosity of the soil is also relevant because the Sand 
Hills sits atop the Ogallala Aquifer—one of the largest aquifer systems in the world.53 In the Final 
EIS, the preferred pipeline route through Nebraska would be located entirely above the Ogallala 
Aquifer (Figure 2). 
                                                 
52 For more information, see the Department of the Interior’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service web page on the Sand 
Hills at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/pfw/ne/ne4.htm.  
53 The entire Ogallala Aquifer system stretches across eight states generally from north to south to include South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas and underlies about 174,000 
square miles. 
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The highly porous soil of the Sand Hills make it a significant recharge zone in the northern region 
of the Ogallala Aquifer system. That is, the sandy, porous soil of the Sand Hills allows a 
significant amount of surface water to enter (recharge) the aquifer system. Water from the aquifer 
also accounts for a significant amount of water use—78% of the region’s public water, 83% of 
irrigation water in Nebraska, and 30% of water used in the U.S. for irrigation and agriculture. 
Potential impacts to the Ogallala Aquifer and the Sand Hills identified in the Final EIS include 
potential groundwater contamination after a release (e.g., a spill or leak from a hole or damaged 
portion of the pipeline) of crude oil during the construction or operation of the proposed pipeline. 
Along the preferred route of the proposed pipeline, areas in the Sand Hills region were identified 
as locations where the water table may be close to the surface. The depth to groundwater is less 
than 10 feet for approximately 65 miles of the preferred pipeline route in Nebraska. Both the soil 
porosity and the close proximity of groundwater to the surface increase the potential that a release 
of oil from the pipeline could contaminate groundwater in the region.54  
Impact on U.S. Energy Security 
In its Presidential Permit application, TransCanada asserts that constructing the proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline is in the U.S national interest to maintain adequate crude oil supplies for 
U.S. refineries. The application argues that the pipeline will allow U.S. refiners to substitute 
Canadian supply for other foreign crude supply and to obtain direct pipeline access to secure and 
growing Canadian crude output. In particular, the application asserts that the pipeline would allow 
the United States to decrease its dependence on foreign crude oil supplies from Mexico and 
Venezuela, the two largest oil importers into the U.S. Gulf Coast.55 In its Draft EIS for the project, 
the State Department similarly finds that the Keystone XL pipeline “would counteract insufficient 
domestic crude oil supply while reducing U.S. dependence on less reliable foreign oil sources.”56  
These arguments have taken on additional weight in light of the recent political unrest in the 
Middle East and North Africa. However, it is worth noting that even if Keystone XL is built, 
prices for the crude oil it carries as well as domestically produced oil from elsewhere will 
continue to be affected by international events. The oil market is globally integrated and events in 
major producer and consumer countries can affect prices everywhere.57 For example, the 
disruption of Libyan supply in early 2011 contributed to higher crude oil prices in the United 
States, even though the United States imported almost no oil from Libya before the unrest broke 
out.58  
                                                 
54 Generally, a release of crude oil to land would not necessarily result in groundwater contamination. In addition to the 
depth from the land surface to groundwater and the characteristics of the environment into which the crude oil is 
released (e.g., characteristics of the underlying soils), the potential for crude oil to reach groundwater would depend on 
factors such as the volume of the spill, the duration of the release, and the viscosity and density of the crude oil.  
55 TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., September 19, 2008, pp. 6-8. 
56 U.S. Department of State, Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL Oil Pipeline Project, April 16, 
2010, p. 4-2. 
57 This is the case unless the oil is stranded due to transport bottlenecks. Ironically, the bottleneck for crude oil flowing 
south from the Midwest to the Gulf Coast—which Keystone XL would help alleviate—helped insulate Midwestern 
crude oil prices from the impacts of unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. However, as is discussed below, this 
may have benefited Midwestern refiners but probably did not significantly reduce costs for U.S. consumers.  
58 For more about this, see CRS Report R41683, Middle East and North Africa Unrest: Implications for Oil and 
Natural Gas Markets, by Michael Ratner and Neelesh Nerurkar. 
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Canadian Oil Imports in the Overall U.S. Supply Context59 
Gross U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products averaged 11.8 million barrels per day 
(Mbpd) in 2010.60 Exports averaged 2.3 Mbpd, leaving net imports at 9.4 Mbpd.61 U.S. net 
imports declined each year between 2005 and 2010 as a result of lower total oil demand and 
higher domestic supply. Domestic demand has decreased by about 1.7 Mbpd versus 2005 levels 
due largely to the economic recession. Meanwhile, U.S. production of oil and oil alternatives 
(including crude oil, natural gas liquids, and biofuels) increased by 1.4 Mbpd between 2005 and 
2010. As a result, net imports fell by roughly 3.1 Mbpd since 2005.62 Some of this decline could 
be mitigated in the near term as oil demand recovers from the recession or if domestic supply 
were to fall. However, there is increasing consensus among forecasters that U.S. net oil imports 
have passed their high water mark already and may remain relatively flat in the long run.63 
Among the largest sources of U.S. gross oil imports are Canada (2.5 Mbpd), the Persian Gulf (1.7 
Mbpd), and Mexico (1.3 Mbpd). Imports from the latter two sources have decreased in recent 
years in part due to lower need for imports described above and in part due to developments in 
those countries (Figure 3). All major Persian Gulf exporters are members of the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which cut production in 2009 to support oil prices. 
Mexican production has been falling since 2004 because new oil developments have not been 
able to offset depletion at Mexico’s giant Cantarell field. Imports from Venezuela, another key 
source of U.S. imports, have also fallen. Venezuelan production never fully recovered after a 
strike at its national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, in 2002-2003. Venezuelan production 
today is nearly 1 Mbpd less than that achieved in 2001. In recent years, Venezuela has also been 
trying to diversify business away from the United States, for example, by increasing exports to 
China.64 
                                                 
59 For a primer on the oil market, see CRS Video Brief Introduction to the Oil Market, at http://www.crs.gov/analysis/
Pages/WVB00002.aspx.  
60 All data in this section are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA’s) Petroleum Navigator 
(http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_m.htm) and International Energy Statistics 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm). 
61 For context, the United States consumes roughly 19 Mbpd, more than 20% of the world’s oil market. 
Net imports are gross or total imports less total exports. This section will focus on gross imports, though it should be 
noted that among U.S. petroleum exports about 0.2 Mbpd of petroleum products go to Canada and 0.4 Mb/d to Mexico. 
62 These data are based on full year 2010 estimates provided by the EIA’s Short Term Energy Outlook (STEO), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/contents.html. The STEO provides a balance of U.S. supply and demand.  
63 For more analysis, see CRS Report R41765, U.S. Oil Imports: Context and Considerations, by Neelesh Nerurkar. 
64 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Venezuela,” February 2010, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Venezuela/Oil.html. 
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Figure 3. U.S. Changes in U.S. Oil Imports, Selected Sources 
Gross imports from four sources, Mbpd 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum Navigator: U.S. Imports by Country 
of Origin,” December 12, 2010, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/
pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_m.htm. 
 
Meanwhile, Canadian production and exports to the United States have increased, primarily due 
to growing output from the oil sands in western Canada. Energy markets in the United States and 
Canada are well integrated by pipeline infrastructure, and nearly all Canadian energy exports go 
to U.S. consumers.65 Canadian oil production has increased about 0.2 Mbpd since 2005, and 
exports to the United States increased by 0.4 Mbpd (Figure 4).66 Canadian oil production is 
expected to grow by as much as 1.6 Mbpd between 2009 and 2025, mostly through increased 
output from the oil sands.67  
                                                 
65 For further analysis of U.S.-Canada energy trade, see CRS Report R41875, The U.S.-Canada Energy Relationship: 
Joined at the Well, by Paul W. Parfomak and Michael Ratner. 
66 As in the United States, Canadian consumption fell due to economic downturn. This allowed the increment in exports 
to be higher than the increment in production.  
67 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), Crude Oil: Forecast, Markets, and Pipelines, June 2010, p. 
2, http://www.capp.ca/getdoc.aspx?DocId=173003. 
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Figure 4. Gross U.S. Oil Imports  
Monthly imports in Mbpd on a 12-month moving average, Jan. 2000 to Oct. 2010 
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum Navigator: U.S. Imports by 
Country of Origin,” December 12, 2010. http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/
pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_m.htm. 
Oil Sands, Keystone XL, and the U.S. Crude Oil Market 
Oil sands (also referred to as tar sands) are a mixture of clay, sand, water, and heavy black 
viscous oil known as bitumen. Oil sands require more processing than conventional crude oil. Oil 
sands are processed to extract the bitumen, which can then be sent to refineries in one of two 
forms. Bitumen can be upgraded into “syncrude,” a light crude that is suitable for pipeline 
transport and is relatively easy to refine. Alternatively, bitumen can be blended with lighter 
hydrocarbons to form a heavy crude that can be transported by pipeline. The bulk of oil sands 
supply growth is expected to be in the form of the latter.68  
Most oil sands imports into the United States currently go to the Midwest, where some refineries 
are investing in complex refining capacity to process growing volumes of heavy Canadian 
crude.69 The U.S. Gulf Coast region already has a large amount of complex refining capacity and 
is considered potentially well suited for processing Canadian heavy crude oil.70 Gulf Coast 
refiners currently process heavy crudes from Venezuela, Mexico, and elsewhere. Complex 
refineries in the Gulf Coast may be best equipped to handle a large increase of heavy oil sands 
crude, though they may still need to adjust processes and make new capital investments in 
equipment to accommodate particular crudes’ characteristics,71 especially if the new Canadian 
crudes will be used in large amounts.72 There are 15 refineries within Keystone XL’s proposed 
                                                 
68 CAPP, 2010, p. 7. 
69 CAPP, 2010, p. 13. According to CAPP, refineries adding capacity to process heavy oil in the Midwest include those 
in Roxana, IL; Whiting, IN, and Detroit, MI.  
70 CAPP, 2010, p. 14. 
71 Baker Hughes, Planning Ahead for Effective Canadian Crude Processing, Baker Petrolite White Paper, 2010, 
http://www.bakerhughes.com/assets/media/whitepapers/4c2a3c8ffa7e1c3c7400001d/file/28271-
canadian_crudeoil_update_whitepaper_06-10.pdf.pdf&fs=1497549. 
72 For a description of which units refineries may need to add (or have added) to be able to process more Canadian oil 
(continued...) 
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delivery area in Texas that currently process heavy crude oil which is similar in composition to 
the oil that Keystone XL pipeline would carry.73  
Oil production from the oil sands is increasing as is production from the Bakken and other areas 
of the U.S. Midwest.74 Transport options to ship crude from the Midwest to the Gulf Cost are 
limited. (Traditionally, crude oil had been shipped up from the Gulf Coast to Midwestern 
refineries). The resulting abundance of crude oil in the Midwest has driven down crude oil prices 
in that region relative to Gulf Coast and international crude prices. Midwestern refiners benefit 
from the lower cost of crude. This, however, does not translate to substantially lower gasoline or 
other products prices for consumers in the Midwest. The Midwest still brings in refined products 
from other regions which keeps refined products prices in line with national and international 
levels.75  
Oil sands producers are interested in Keystone XL because it would expand their market reach 
into the Gulf Coast region. This would increase the number of refineries they could sell their 
crude to because Gulf Coast refineries have more upgrading capacity which is better suited to run 
heavy crude. Reaching a larger market and one with more upgrading capacity could increase the 
price these producers receive for their crude. Gulf Coast refiners are interested in the Keystone 
XL pipeline because it increases the supply of heavy sour crude in the Gulf region, potentially 
bringing down their input costs relative to the options they currently have available. Canadian 
Natural Resources Limited, an oil sands producer, and Valero Energy Corporation, a large U.S. 
refiner, are among those that contracted for shipping capacity on the Keystone XL pipeline. 
With expanded pipeline capacity extending to the U.S. Gulf Coast, Canadian oil sands crude may 
compete with other heavy crudes such as those from Mexico, Venezuela, and elsewhere.76 It is 
difficult to predict precisely how this competition will play out, but it may take place through 
shifting discounts or premiums on crude oils from various sources.77 It may be possible for 
Canadian oil supplies to effectively “push out” waterborne shipments from other countries, 
although this depends on a wide range of market conditions. Waterborne crudes may more easily 
go to other destinations than Canadian crudes, though like Canadian crudes they can be tied to 
specialized refining capacity, as is true for Venezuelan heavy crudes.  
There is concern that this increased supply of crude to the Gulf Coast may result in larger refined 
product exports rather than contributing to lower domestic fuel cost. Although the United States is 
a net importer of oil and oil products, it does export some refined products.78 U.S. refined product 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
sands supply, see Praveen Gunaseelan and Christopher Buehler, “Changing US Crude Imports Are Driving Refinery 
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73 U.S. Department of State, April 15, 2011. p. 1-4. 
74 See increased U.S. crude oil production in the Midwest under the PADD2 heading at the following source: Energy 
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Crude Oil Production (by PADD), Petroleum & Other 
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76 Center for Energy Economics and Bureau of Economic Geology, Overview of the Alberta Oil Sands, University of 
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exports rose when domestic demand declined in the wake of the recession and as foreign demand 
for certain fuels, like diesel, has remained relatively robust. If Keystone XL secures growing oil 
sands output to flow into the United States, it could push out seaborne crudes from elsewhere, 
regardless of where the product is ultimately sold. If the absence of the pipeline encourages 
Canadian oil sands producers and pipeline companies to find an alternate export route through the 
Canadian West Coast, Canadian supplies may displace heavy oil supplies in other markets and 
potentially allow relatively more overseas imports coming into the Gulf Coast. This possibility is 
discussed further below.  
Other Pipeline Projects 
Apart from Keystone XL, several other pipeline proposals could help carry growing Canadian 
crude oil supplies to the U.S. Gulf Coast. On October 16, 2011, Enbridge announced it would 
purchase ConocoPhillips share of the Seaway pipeline and reverse its direction to bring crude oil 
from the Midwest to the Gulf Coast. ConocoPhillips had kept the pipeline running northward to 
serve its refinery in Ponca City, OK. However, the glut of oil in the Midwest had resulted in the 
pipeline running at low volumes. Nonetheless, ConocoPhillips had been uninterested in reversing 
the pipeline. ConocoPhillips, which is spinning off its refining business,79 is now selling its share 
of Seaway to Enbridge. Enbridge and Seaway shareholder Enterprise Products Partners L.P. 
immediately announced that they would reverse the direction of crude oil flows on the Seaway 
pipeline to enable it to transport oil from Cushing, OK, to the U.S. Gulf Coast. Pending 
regulatory approval, the line could operate in reversed service with an initial capacity of 150,000 
barrels per day by second quarter 2012.80  
Prior to the Seaway sale, Enbridge has reported it has significant commitments for two new 
pipeline projects, Flanagan South and Wrangler, that would carry oil from Illinois to Oklahoma 
and then from Oklahoma to Texas.81 According to Enbridge, the project would duplicate existing 
routes and does not cross an international border, in which case it does not require a Presidential 
Permit. Enbridge already has cross border pipeline capacity connecting Alberta to Illinois. 
However, according to reports, Wrangler has been canceled in light of the Seaway purchase and 
reversal.82 Like Keystone XL, these projects would also have facilitated increased flow of 
Canadian crude to the U.S. Gulf Coast.  
Canadian Oil to Alternative Markets 
In 2010, 98% of Canada’s oil exports went to the United States, mostly through north-south 
pipelines. One major oil pipeline extends from Alberta to Canada’s west coast: the Trans 
Mountain Pipeline, which is owned by Houston-based Kinder Morgan and has a capacity of 
300,000 bpd. Some of the oil from the Trans Mountain Pipeline is loaded onto tankers and 
                                                 
79 ConocoPhillips, “ConocoPhillips Pursuing Plan to Separate into Two Stand-Alone, Publicly Traded Companies,” 
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press release, November 16, 2011, http://www.enbridge.com/MediaCentre/News.aspx?yearTab=en2011&id=1530773. 
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82 Ben Lefebvre, “Enterprise Products Cancels Wrangler Pipeline,” November 16, 2011. 
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shipped from Vancouver. Currently, about 90% of the crude shipped out by sea goes to California, 
with the remainder shipped to the U.S. Gulf Coast and Asia.83  
There are proposals to increase the capacity for oil from Alberta to reach the Canadian west coast. 
Kinder Morgan is considering expanding the Trans Mountain Pipeline to 700,000 bpd, more than 
doubling its existing capacity, and expanding west coast shipping facilities. Enbridge has 
proposed a new pipeline: the Northern Gateway project would have a 525,000 bpd capacity to 
send oil from Edmonton to Kimat, British Columbia.84 These projects reflect anticipated growth 
of western Canadian oil production and an interest by Canadian oil producers to diversify their 
available markets beyond U.S. customers. Both proposals have received criticism from 
environmentalists. Because it would require construction of a completely new pipeline, Northern 
Gateway in particular has been criticized by some environmental and First Nations groups.85  
If export capacity to the west coast is expanded it could increase the amount of Canadian crude 
oil going to non-U.S. markets. Canadian interests assert that Canadian oil sales to Asian markets, 
where oil demand is growing rapidly, are more likely if greater shipments to the United States are 
not possible.86 A study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy suggested that: 
if pipeline projects to the BC [British Columbia] coast are built, they are likely to be utilized. 
This is because of the relatively short marine distances to major northeast Asia markets, 
future expected growth there in refining capacity and increasing ownership interests by 
Chinese companies especially in oil sands production. Such increased capacity would alter 
global crude trade patterns. Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB) crudes would be 
“lost” from the USA, going instead to Asia. There they would displace the world’s balancing 
crude oils, Middle Eastern and African predominantly OPEC grades, which would in turn 
move to the USA. The net effect would be substantially higher U.S. dependency on crude 
oils from those sources versus scenarios where capacity to move WCSB crudes to Asia was 
limited.87 
Economic Impact of the Pipeline 
In addition to supply diversity arguments, some Keystone XL pipeline proponents support the 
project based on economic benefits associated with expanding U.S. pipeline infrastructure. A 
recent study by the Energy Policy Research Foundation, for example, concludes that “the 
Keystone expansion would provide net economic benefits from improved efficiencies in both the 
transportation and processing of crude oil of $100 million-$600 million annually, in addition to an 
immediate boost in construction employment.”88 A 2009 report from the Canadian Energy 
                                                 
83 Lucretia Cardenas, “Kinder Morgan Says Eyes Fall Open Season For Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion,” Platts, 
March 24, 2011. 
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30, 2010.  
87 EnSys Energy & Systems, Inc., Keystone XL Assessment: Final Report, Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, 
Office of Policy & International Affairs, December 23, 2010, p. 118. 
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Research Institute (CERI) commissioned by the American Petroleum Institute similarly concludes 
that: 
As investment and production in oil sands ramps up in Canada, the pace of economic activity 
quickens and demand for US goods and services increase rapidly, resulting in an estimated 
343 thousand new US jobs between 2011 and 2015. Demand for US goods and services 
continues to climb throughout the period, adding an estimated $34 billion to US GDP in 
2015, $40.4 billion in 2020, and $42.2 billion in 2025.89 
These CERI estimates apply to the entire oil sands industry, however, not only the Keystone XL 
project, and they are derived from a proprietary economic analysis which has not been subject to 
external review. Some stakeholders point to State Department and other studies reporting much 
lower anticipated economic benefits.90 Consequently, it is difficult to determine what specific 
economic and employment impacts may ultimately be attributable to the Keystone XL pipeline. 
Nonetheless, given the physical scale of the project, it could be expected to increase employment 
and investment at least during construction. 
Canadian Oil Sands Environmental Impacts 
Oil production from oil sands is controversial because it has significant environmental impacts, 
including emissions of greenhouse gases during extraction and processing, disturbance of mined 
land, and impacts on wildlife and water quality.91 Because bitumen in oil sands cannot be pumped 
from a conventional well, it must be mined, usually using strip mining or open pit techniques, or 
the oil can be extracted with underground heating methods.92 Large amounts of water and natural 
gas are also required (for heating) during the extraction process.93 The magnitude of the 
environmental impacts of oil sands production, in absolute terms and compared to conventional 
oil production, has been the subject of numerous, and sometimes conflicting, studies and policy 
papers.94 Some stakeholders who object to oil sands projects oppose the Keystone XL pipeline 
because it expands access to new markets for the oil produced by those projects, thereby 
encouraging what they consider to be further environmentally destructive oil sands development. 
As discussed earlier, however, if oil sands production can be diverted to other markets (e.g., 
Asia), preventing the Keystone XL project may not necessarily limit oil sands development.95 
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Fossil Fuels Dependence and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Some stakeholders object to the Keystone XL pipeline because it would increase U.S. supplies of 
oil, and thereby perpetuate the nation’s dependence on imported fossil fuels and increase carbon 
emissions from the transportation sector.96 Acknowledging this concern, in a public forum on 
October 20, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton reportedly remarked that “we’re either going to be 
dependent on dirty oil from the [Persian] Gulf or dirty oil from Canada … until we can get our act 
together as a country and figure out that clean, renewable energy is in both our economic interests 
and the interests of our planet.”97 Critics of the State Department’s draft and Supplemental Draft 
EIS assert that the environmental review overlooks the pipeline project’s overall impact on 
greenhouse gas emissions, for example, from the extraction and refining processes. To address 
those potential emissions, EPA recommends that the final EIS include discussion of mitigation 
approaches for greenhouse gas emissions from extraction activities that are either currently used 
or could be employed to help lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions.98 However, others have 
argued that whether the Keystone XL Pipeline is constructed would have little bearing on 
greenhouse gas emissions as there are likely to be other export routes available for Canadian oil 
sands crude, and therefore, the same crude oils would still be transported and refined, albeit in 
different locations.99 
 
                                                 
96 See, for example: Natural Resources Defense Council, Tar Sands Invasion: How Dirty and Expensive Oil from 
Canada Threatens America’s New Energy Economy, May 2010. 
97 See footnote 30. 
98 See EPA letter referenced in footnote 29, p. 7. 
99 EnSys Energy & Systems 2010, p. 116. 
Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 23 
Appendix. Presidential Permitting Authority 
The executive branch has exercised permitting authority over the construction and operation of 
“pipelines, conveyor belts, and similar facilities for the exportation or importation of petroleum, 
petroleum products” and other products at least since the promulgation of Executive Order 11423 
in 1968.100 Executive Order 13337 amended this authority and the procedures associated with the 
review, but did not substantially alter the exercise of authority or the delegation to the Secretary 
of State in E.O. 11423.101 However, the source of the executive branch’s permitting authority is 
not entirely clear from the text of these Executive Orders. Generally, powers exercised by the 
executive branch are authorized by legislation or are inherent presidential powers based in the 
Constitution. E.O. 11423 makes no mention of any authority, and E.O. 13337 refers only to the 
“Constitution and the Laws of the United States of America, including Section 301 of title 3, 
United States Code.”102 Section 301 simply provides that the President is empowered to delegate 
authority to the head of any department or agency of the executive branch.  
The legitimacy of this permitting authority has been addressed by federal courts. In Sisseton v. 
United States Department of State, the plaintiff Tribes filed suit and asked the court to suspend or 
revoke the Presidential Permit issued under E.O. 13337 for the TransCanada Keystone 
Pipeline.103 The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota found that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they would be unable to prove their injury could be redressed by a 
favorable decision.104 The court determined that even if the plaintiff’s injury could be redressed, 
“the President would be free to disregard the court’s judgment,” as the case concerned the 
President’s “inherent Constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy,” as opposed to statutory 
authority granted to the President by Congress.105  
The court further found that even if the Tribes had standing, the issuance of the Presidential 
Permit was a presidential action, not an agency action subject to judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).106 The court stated that the authority to regulate the cross-
border pipeline lies with either Congress or the President.107 The court found that “Congress has 
failed to create a federal regulatory scheme for the construction of oil pipelines, and has delegated 
this authority to the states. Therefore, the President has the sole authority to allow oil pipeline 
border crossings under his inherent constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs.”108 The 
President could delegate his permitting authority to the U.S. Department of State, but delegation 
did not transform the permit’s issuance into an agency action reviewable under the APA.109 
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In Sierra Club v. Clinton,110 the plaintiff Sierra Club challenged the Secretary of State’s decision 
to issue a Presidential Permit authorizing the Alberta Clipper pipeline. Among the plaintiff’s 
claims was an allegation that issuance of the permit was unconstitutional because the President 
had no authority to issue the permits referenced in E.O. 13337 (in this case, for the importation of 
crude oil from Canada via pipeline).111 The defendant responded that the authority to issue 
Presidential Permits for these border-crossing facilities “does not derive from a delegation of 
congressional authority ... but rather from the President’s constitutional authority over foreign 
affairs and his authority as Commander in Chief.”112 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Minnesota agreed, noting that the defendant’s assertion regarding the source of the President’s 
authority has been “well recognized” in a series of Attorney General opinions, as well as a 2009 
judicial opinion.113 The court also noted that these permits had been issued many times before and 
that “Congress has not attempted to exercise any exclusive authority over the permitting process. 
Congress’s inaction suggests that Congress has accepted the authority of the President to issue 
cross-border permits.”114 Based on the historical recognition of the President’s authority to issue 
these permits and Congress’s implied approval through inaction, the court found the Presidential 
Permit requirement for border facilities constitutional. 
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